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Empty Time as Traumatic Duration:
Towards a Cinematic Aevum
Kelli Fuery, Chapman University
Abstract:
Frank Kermode uses the term aevum to question the links between origin,
order, and time, associating experience with spatial form. Without end or
beginning, aevum identifies an intersubjective order of time where we participate
in the “relation between the fictions by which we order our world and the
increasing complexity of what we take to be the ‘real’ history of that world”; being
“in-between” time is a primary quality of the aevum. Regarding cinema, aevum
identifies this third duration as emotional experience, occuring as traumatic time.
It facilitates thinking beyond lived temporal experience of everyday life to a
philosophy of experience that accounts for alternative sensoria of time, similar to
the traumatic encounter. The cinematic aevum is equally not of the material,
corporeal world; concurrently associating human reality with the myths of the
human condition. To say that a cinematic aevum exists following traumatic scenes,
is to specify a visual “time-fiction” in film, to recognise a spatial form that belongs
neither to the finite time of the film’s narrative, or of the “eternal” time outside the
film’s diegesis, but participates in the order (and linking) of both. Wilfred Bion’s
psychoanalytic works are used to discuss the traumatic symptom of “empty time”:
the inability to recollect, to make links between memory and experience,
demonstrating a version of empty time that works as an external violence to
spectator perception. Bion’s theories offer fresh psychoanalytic perspective on
trauma and its relationship to time by challenging classical ways of thinking
about inner and outer perception.
Keywords: Aevum; Frank Kermode; Wilfred Bion; emotional experience; time;
trauma; cinema.
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The usual response to traumatic events is to avoid thinking about
them, “to banish them from consciousness” (Herman, 1992/2015, p. 1)
and yet when one reviews the history of cinema – popular, global,
and independent alike – the number of films that integrate traumatic
experience as a plot device or aesthetic rationale show it as being
overwhelmingly present. Instead of avoidance, cinema exercises a
capacity to effect traumatic attraction. Trauma, as disruptive, persistent,
and affective experience that occurs within the duration of our lives, finds
containment (if ephemeral) in cinema via displacement. As Judith
Herman (1992/2015) writes, the drive to avoid thinking about traumatic
experience is equalled by the certainty that it cannot be avoided, “murder
will out. Remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are
prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the
healing of individual victims” (p. 1). Herman is, of course, speaking
about real life experience, yet this desire to restore a harmonious
balance and move toward healing also structures cinematic narrative.
The relationship between cinema and trauma has been, and continues
to be, examined in terms of affective and emotional experience for
audiences (Ambrosió-Garcia, 2016; Caruth, 1996; Fuery, 2018), and
in terms of impact regarding innovation in cinematic technological
development (Doane, 2002; Mulvey, 2006). Later in the article, I consider
the proliferation of cinema’s technological development as an indicator of
our changing relationships with time and indicative of our evolving
capacities to use time creatively. In altering the order and structure of
time via new screen-fictions, we modify our orientation and experiences
with time and the ways in which stories of trauma are told; but told
they are, and the need to express these stories remains despite their varied
presentations.
Rather than focus on prescriptive examples and representations of
trauma within cinema, I am interested in the underlying motivations that
propel audiences’ repeated return to difficult and distressing stories,
especially if such considerable psychic energy is spent avoiding our own.
Trauma, in real life, often leaves us feeling numb or unable to recall in
detail the corresponding event, and I associate the aesthetic, affective, and
embodied impact resultant from trauma with contemporary psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion’s Attacks on Linking (1959/1967a) and A Theory
of Thinking (1962/1967b). Bion’s theories are discussed in detail later,
but here briefly, an “attack on linking” refers to the destruction of the
ability to make connections between sensory lived experience and
the thinking or processing of such experience. Simply put, Bion’s
psychoanalytic model speaks to an embodied sense of feeling disconnected from parts of yourself, from the world around you, unable to think
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positively or to make good associations within the duration of life.
It helps to articulate what trauma does to our inner world, attacking the
ability to make connections between our past, present, and future in
emotionally expansive ways. Cinematic trauma, as a variable term,
simultaneously refers to film fictions that contain traumatic narratives
and visual effects, and to the potential and actual trauma that may occur
during cinematic experience. It is not possible to outline a universal
definition when it comes to traumatic experience, particularly with
respect to cinema. Some examples of cinematic trauma may excite
viewers, resulting in detailed recall, but injure others, engendering
repression or avoidance.
Frank Kermode’s seminal study of time-fictions, The Sense of an Ending
(1966/2000), offers a specific exploration regarding fictions about the
End with respect to the investment and recurrent interest in stories of
apocalypse, and the turbulence within sensory life. He begins his treatise
with the reflexive observation that the task of the critic lies in “making
sense of the ways we try to make sense of our lives” (1966/2000, p. 3). By
examining fictions about the End, Kermode considered the need for
fictions as a way of filling our time “between the tick and tock” (p. 63), that
is, the interval of human life. Kermode questioned the way in which
literary fictions about apocalypses play out the existential tensions we
imagine about the end of the world. It was precisely within these fictions
(their repetition and recurrence) where he saw humanity’s attempt
to determine their belonging and sense of importance in a world that
often appears indifferent. The primary form of attention involved in this
sense-making activity is our experience of and with time, more
specifically our experience with such time-fictions. In attending to our
perspectives and uses of time-fictions, we satisfy our need to know the
“shape of life” (p. 3), experiences of and with time, forming a sensibility
of time-consciousness.
On these terms, Kermode’s interest in time-fictions as a means to make
sense of the ways in which we make sense of human life connects well
with Bionian psychoanalysis. Both authors interrogate the emotional
experience associated with apocalypse (or trauma) as a need to know, that
is, to think and feel lived experience. In Learning from Experience (1962),
Bion, following Melanie Klein (1975), established a rigorous study
of unconscious emotional experience. Despite significant scholarship
on the intersections between trauma and cinema, and recent growth in
references to Bion in film and media studies (Ambrosió-Garcia, 2016;
Fuery, 2018), discussion of his ideas on the subject of trauma still relies
on the hermeneutics of clinical application. Bion’s (1959/1967a) work on
“the destructive attack in the production” of thought (p. 93), for example,
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examines how our associations within lived emotional experience come
under threat. His theory of thinking is a model that helps to consider how
certain durations of time might work as containment with cinema, as
intervals which support the potential processing of turbulent emotional
experience, facilitating the ability to link thoughts that would otherwise
be lost, denied or negated due to traumatic events. Containment, in the
Bionian sense, refers to psychical and corporeal processes which link
“emotion to thought, sensory data to felt experience” (Fuery, 2018,
p. 171). This offers a divergent way of thinking about the function of time
in relation to trauma in cinema, how it affects one’s capacity to make
associations with time and how, in turn, this impacts the thinking of
emotional experience. Bion’s writings help to account for the affect of
crisis time-fictions as sensory experience of intervals within everyday life,
providing an underexplored psychoanalytic perspective on trauma in
cinema and its relationship to time by challenging classical ways of
thinking about inner and outer perception.
While Kermode distinguishes between specific literary fictions and a
meta-theory of fiction, his interpretation of aevum with respect to our
relationship to time and fiction remains valuable. In the twentieth and
twenty-first century, the use of literature as an object and structure finds
new parallels via screen objects and structures, where the prevalence of
crisis-fictions has neither waned or discontinued. Where literature was
once a new parallel for crisis-fictions in painting, now screen media
proliferate new crisis-fictions in response to rising ambiguity in uncertain
times. It seems that the more unsure humanity feels about its future, its
belonging and knowing of the world and each other, the more in need it
is of crisis-fictions to think through the subsequent unrest. Kermode
(1966/2000) refers to this enduring and repetitive tradition as a “need for
concord-fictions” manifested via “the modern apocalypse” (p. 63), noting
that while fictions themselves may transition in response to socio-political
and historical events, it is the belief in crisis, or a perpetual preoccupation
with the End that remains “immanent rather than imminent” (p. 101).
These apocalypses, or crises, as expressions of trauma work as considerations of our relationships with time as modalities or orientations
to what I argue is “empty time as traumatic duration” within cinematic
experience. In cinema, worlds are given and destroyed regularly,
encapsulating imagined pasts and predicted futures, equal projections
which demonstrate the unconscious activity of splitting parts of ourselves onto/into the materialities of our external world. Apocalypses
are performed and designed ad infinitum as trauma time-fictions,
they creatively contain multiple intervals of tick-tock to make sense of
our lives.
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Film scholar Janet Walker (2005) has written on the impact of
recurrent global conflict in documentaries and television programs
dealing with incest, focusing specifically on the consequential relationships between trauma and memory – what we might see as an example of
Kermode’s enduring modern apocalypses. Her study on the legacy of
trauma cinema looks closely at the links between memory, trauma, and
representation to examine the “social consequence of this heritage of
catastrophe” (p. xv). Walker’s close textual analyses of documentary and
incest narratives offer informative statements on the connections between
myths of history and the indeterminacy of trauma and memory; however,
while valuable, this is not the approach that I follow here. As Susannah
Radstone (2007) has noted, a key intention, perhaps driving principle
of the much broader field of trauma theory is to address states of
suspension, in-between, and the referential: “trauma theory suggests that
the relation between representation and ‘actuality’ might be reconceived
as one constituted by the absence of traces” (p. 12). Radstone’s work on
trauma is instructive to my theorisation of “empty time as traumatic
duration” as she rigorously questions the relationship between trauma
and representation, moving beyond classical applications of psychoanalytic theory and acknowledging the limits of text and language. She
intimates the affective centrality of trauma in life by highlighting external
experience, asking “is it that theories of trauma are taken to illuminate the
relation between actuality and representation in general, or is it that
actuality is beginning to be taken as traumatic in and of itself?” (p. 13).
Here, it is the engagement with the actuality of trauma and its relational
qualities over textual representation, which recognises not specifically
trauma, but rather time-fiction as a theoretical field. Trauma theory has
stood in-between epistemes, existing primarily as an embodied, if
fractured, time-consciousness. Kermode views the interest in apocalyptic
narratives as a focus of in-betweenness that is indicative of the “middest”.
This notion of middest as interval, of interstital being, is positioned here
to attend to the experience of cinematic time as offering a traumatic
duration that follows a presentation of crisis, most specifically as a crisisfiction.
Kermode (1966/2000) writes that it is during the middest – our life
span as humans before death and after birth – where our need for “fictive
concords” (p. 7), those stories tethered to beginnings and ends, help us
order and work through our anxieties and hopes. Such stories of Ends,
apocalypses, and crises as traumatic time-fictions, however they are
imagined, are “models of the world” (p. 4), which help us to make sense
of the ways in which we make sense of the world. Our attention is what
saves us, gives us hope, and establishes our meaningfulness and relation
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to others and ourselves, and as such we must study time fictions so that
they are not relegated into oblivion. Kermode’s study of time-fictions as
models for us to negotiate and think through our existential and
ontological states also examines the concord, or linking, between belonging and knowing, for “to speak humanly of becoming and knowing is the
task of pure being” (p. 3), implicitly connecting with two key principles
that underwrite Bion’s (1962/1967b) theory of thinking. I align
Kermode’s use of knowing here with Bion’s treatment of knowing as a
proto-mental state, where thinking and knowing form emotional experience as concurrent embodied and embedded being. For now I wish to
note that, in addition to an awareness of time and its chronicity, how we
belong to time was important for Kermode, specifically our relation to
time(s), our knowing it as “a need in the moment of existence to belong,
to be related to a beginning and to an end” (p. 4), with the emphasis
shifting away from examining representation and moving toward an
attention of sensory relation.
The aim is to place Kermode’s theory of aevum and time-fiction in
conversation with Bion’s conceptualisation of linking, particularly in
response to the recurrence of crisis time-fictions, and to situate cinema (as
varied and variable as that term and apparatus continues to be) as a
medium-transition that continues types of crisis-fictions. The source of
fictions of the End are extended here as changing configurations of screen
media within culture. This has the advantage of continuing Kermode’s
project, who claims that it was not only our filling the interval of human
life with “varied concord-fictions” (p. 63) that was significant, but also
our need to continue to feel concord through such fictions. Therefore, the
application of Kermode’s analysis of time-fiction is directed away from its
original literary emphasis to a cinematic one. This is not a transposition of
theory but rather a questioning of how our engagement with time-fictions
might work with moving-images, despite also referencing cinematic time
with respect to film characters and audience spectatorship. Three films
are discussed here to typify a formal aesthetic specific to potential
audience emotional experience with time, illustrating what is meant by
“empty time as traumatic duration.” Each film exemplifies a sensory timeconsciousness and being-with-time that occurs as a result from trauma in
the diegesis, or because it offers audiences time to sit with traumatic
events that have occurred. Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, 1960), Taxi Driver
(Martin Scorsese, 1976), and The Headless Woman (La mujer sin cabeza,
Lucrecia Martel, 2008) explicate the varied formal creativity in fictive
expressions of Ends, as well as their recurrence over time and across
cultures. They are not meant as synecdoches or exhaustive examples and
as such, they represent the intersubjective aesthetics of time-fictions that
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exist and are possible in cinema, which change in type over time but
remain nonetheless.
The Significance of the Interval
Kermode (1966/2000) regards fictions of the End functioning both as
type and source (p. 6), citing the Bible as offering a particularly regulatory
fiction regarding humanity’s sense of belonging. If, as Kermode suggests,
the Bible is an UR-source of apocalypse time-fiction, then as a type it
presents the significance of the in-between of time – a meaningful
interval between the beginning tick and the end tock, as “we can perceive
a duration only when it is organized” (p. 45). Kermode’s analogy of
tick-tock is to make us focus on the interval between the start of the tick
and the end of the tock, to realise the time-consciousness of the interval as
the structuring device for making meaning of the middest. This founding
structure of interval as interstitial time enables Kermode to theorise
further its complexity and plurality, claiming that the in-between of the
tick-tock needs complex fictions to prevent meaninglessness, “to defeat
the tendency of the interval between tick and tock to empty itself […] the
interval must be purged of simple chronicity, of the emptiness of tock-tick,
humanly uninteresting successiveness” (p. 46). This is the threat of
trauma, it will hollow out the interval, reversing the tick-tock to tock-tick,
thereby destroying the possibility of any linking within the experience
of time and of life.
The term “empty time” as argued here does not refer to the interval’s
tendency to empty itself of meaning. In cinema, empty time, as a formal
temporal duration following traumatic scenes, works precisely against
such purging. “Empty time” foregrounds the affective aesthetic impact of
trauma in film, recognising primarily a stylistic practice that occurs after
scenes of trauma in film. Slow tracking/panning shots that effect static
moments illuminate “empty time as traumatic duration,” creating a
cinematic aevum where attention is arrested through the avoidance of
cuts and prevalence for lengthier shots. This constructs an in-between
time for both the character and the audience, linking trauma with its
afterwardness – Nachträglichkeit – Sigmund Freud’s (1895/1975) term
for delayed action where memory is an experience of a memory of the
trauma rather than trauma itself. Empty time allows spectators to
experience the film within a duration that is not solely concerned with
furthering the film’s story. Concurrent with the time and emotional
experience of the character, it invites the audience into a parallel,
containing relationship with cinematic time, making sense of the trauma
that has occurred. Throughout Scorsese’s Taxi Driver, the interval structures the different types of trauma permitting the audience to think
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through the moral complexities they expose. In addition to its ultraviolence (e.g., use of blood squibs, loud sounds, and blood splatter), Taxi
Driver presents further trauma through moral violence by continuously
postioning Travis Bickle (Robert De Niro) as both hero and villian.
After Bickle shoots Sport (Harvey Keitel) on the steps of a New York
brownstone, he walks away a little, resting for a moment on a nearby
stoop. The camera follows, waiting with him as he appears to think over
his next move. Sport pimps child prostitutes and his murder is unlikely to
present significant moral difficulty for the audience. We stay with Bickle
on the steps, a brief interval offered as pause, foreshadowing the longer,
more prominent interval that follows inside the building after he has
murdered Sport and two other men. Bickle unsuccessfully tries to shoot
himself (he runs out of bullets) and sits down on a sofa. The second
interval occurs via a bird’s eye shot tracking over Iris’s (Jodie Foster) room
with a loud score incorporating trumpets, snare drum, and harp arpeggio.
The tracking shot shows two motionless police officers, their frozen
stance establishing a different duration and relation to time for the
audience. On recognising the officers’ lack of motion, the spectator is
invited to engage with a different time-fiction with the film. The continuous shot moves down the stairs, reflecting on the brutal murders,
linking the internal reality of the trauma with the external reality of the
public and police who are waiting outside on the street.
This sequence demonstrates the aesthetic tendency to portray
traumatic events through a series of temporal fragments, illustrating the
various structures of crises which bear the weight of the anxieties of the
film’s characters. Iris has suffered at the hands of men and is confronted
with the cognitive dissonance of Bickle’s heroism and brutal murders. As
the film develops, the audience encounters the paradox of Bickle’s
vigilantism, his concern for Iris and misplaced righteousness. Here, the
intervals of time act as intercessors to the violence, offering an ordering of
time similar to what Laura Mulvey (2006) has referred to as “delayed
cinema.” For Mulvey, this delay explicitly notes the shift in flow of
cinematic time; put simply, it slows down, breaking narrative continuity.
In the example of Taxi Driver, time also shifts perspective – moving from
eye-level to a topographical point of view. This slowing down of time
incites a further disruption wherein “some detail has lain dormant […]
waiting to be noticed” (Mulvey, 2006, p. 8), indicating a parallel with the
Freudian Nachtraglichkeit. The interval, or delay, is an interruption to the
flow of cinematic time, permitting the spectator to shift into a pensive
frame of mind. The interval incites a stillness for “the pensive spectator
with the process of delaying cinema, capturing the moment of mutation
in the act and the reflecting on the representation of time” (2006, p. 189).
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The fictive end of this interval (Kermode’s tock) is signaled by the camera
pan moving out onto the street scene, and subsequently orders the unit of
this time-fiction.
However, there is a critical difference between the pensive spetactor’s
relationship to time and what is being established here as empty time.
Mulvey models her pensive spectator upon Raymond Bellour’s conceptualisation by incorporating sensibilities of anticipation and “thoughtful
reflection” (Mulvey, 2006, p. 195). In such cases, the delayed aesthetics of
the cinematic interval direct what is to be thought about, its materiality
informing the topic or theme on which we are to ruminate. While there
are certainly some similarities here, my conceptualisation of empty time
resists contemplative or meditative thought. In Taxi Driver, empty time is
defined by the moral ambiguity, and perhaps even the amorality, of both
Bickle’s character and actions. This time-fiction within the film enables
the spectator to form a secondary or parallel relationship which goes
beyond a direct thinking about what has just taken place. In response to
the traumatic events, the spectator is left adrift in making moral
judgements about such characters with the disruptive interval remaining
constitutive of, and attached to, the traumatic experience itself.
Kermode’s foregrounded interest in apocalypse and crisis-fictions as
a means to make sense of the world proposes a durational paradox.
On the surface, to be interested and find satisfaction in traumatic stories
suggests a (psychosomatic) masochism, an economic problem (Freud
1924/2007). Freud argued that we are driven to seek pleasure (or
satisfaction) and avoid unpleasure, and on this basis it would seem that
enjoying stories of the End would dispute this model. Yet for Kermode
(1966/2000), “crisis, however facile the conception, is inescapably a
central element in our endeavors toward making sense of our world”
(p. 94) and while this shares some elements with the Freudian model of
the mind, Bion’s theory of thinking presents an alternative interpretative
position. Bion (1962/1967b) believed our satisfaction was made possible
through a capacity to tolerate and think emotional turbulence, an ability
to confront frustration and not avoid it. These turbulent, traumatic crisisfictions reflect sensoria relevant to Bion’s “need to know” and Kermode’s
need to feel concord. Of the modern apocalypse, Kermode (1966/2000)
writes, “crisis is a way of thinking about one’s moment, and not inherent
in the moment itself” (p. 101). If it is accepted that crises or apocalypses
are different types or expressions of trauma, not unlike the afterwardness
of Nachträglichkeit, then Kermode’s assertion can be likened to Bion’s
model of mental development, particularly on the basis of time. Bion
viewed thinking as something that was contingent on capacity. First
comes “the development of thoughts” (1962/1967b, p. 110) which
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requires “an apparatus to cope with them” (p. 111), and secondly, only
after such an apparatus or capacity is present can thinking be possible,
“thinking has to be called into existence to cope with thoughts” (p. 111).
I have written on this at length elsewhere (Fuery, 2018) so let us return to
the focus on aevum, time-fiction, and cinematic experience.
Aevum
Aevum, as an ordering of time, recognises not simply a third category,
but a “third duration, between that of time and eternity” (Kermode,
1966/2000, p. 70). Since Thomas Aquinas, aevum has continued to
address not only an in-between category of duration or existence, it has
evolved to speak primarily to our experience of and with time, that is,
our affective relation with time. Indeed, the concept of aevum was coined
to solve a durational paradox, its usefulness extending to reflection on
the relationship between durations themselves – eternity (God’s time),
aevum (in-between, immortal angel time that lacks an end), and humanity
(material time that has a beginning and an end, defined by the middest).
Kermode’s use of aevum highlights its status as a time-fiction to
question the links between origin, order, and time and to identify the
weight/wait of the interval and the attention it demands. As a word that
associates time with experience and spatial form – without end or
beginning – aevum notes an intersubjective order of time that we
participate with in its construction. Kermode (1966/2000) saw it as a
“relation between the fictions by which we order our world and
the increasing complexity of what we take to be the ‘real’ history of that
world” (p. 67). We might say, being “in-between” time is a primary quality
of the aevum, what supports the concord-fictions between tick-tock of
human existence and prevents the interval from being devoid of meaning,
simply passing time.
Aevum works similarly in the realm of cinema, which is equally not of
the material, corporeal world. This interval of cinematic time concurrently links human reality with fictions of the human condition that
attempt to make sense of such reality. As an intersubjective, embodied,
ordering time-fiction, a cinematic aevum draws attention to the happening
of time that occurs in-between experiences, well suited to the analyses of
emotional experience that go beyond trauma (guilt, for example).
Kermode sees the time-fiction of aevum as representative of all fictional
time – the time we experience when engaged with stories, “not temporal
or eternal […] but participating in both” (p. 72). Used contemporaneously, aevum facilitates thinking about experiences of time beyond the
time of angels. It is a means of thinking everyday experience, linking
beginnings and ends, and thinking a philosophy of lived experience that
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we might extend to other kinds of affective time. This incurs a need to
develop or consider different articulations of a cinematic aevum, recognising varying relationships with time across and between cinemas as
well as emotional experiences. Crisis or trauma time-fictions typify one
variety of cinematic aevum, an arrest of temporal duration to engender a
spectator’s acute awareness. Cinematic trauma, as a time-fiction, holds
a unique (but not sole) perspective on the aevum, revealing a relationship
with cinematic time that often goes unnoticed.
To note a specific type of cinematic aevum that follows traumatic scenes,
is to recognise a visual time-fiction as temporal duration in film; to
recognise a spatial form that belongs neither to the finite time of the film’s
narrative (its tick-tock), or of the “eternal” time outside the film’s diegesis,
but participates in the order and linking of both. Kermode (1966/2000)
notes that aevum is an “awkward word” but sees its potential in
identifying other typologies of duration beyond that of angels, widening
its reach to include other interstitial durations such as the “time of characters” and also of “ordinary human life” (p. 195), where the experience
of real time can be linked (concorded) with the affective sensory
experience that occurs within such durations. Here, and within the
context of cinema, aevum identifies an intersubjective sensory quality
specific to the duration of time focused on emotional experience that
occurs as “empty time.”
A core property of the aevum, then, is its capacity to register lived
experience as something that “truly exists in another realm of time”
(Kermode, 1966/2000, p. 194) – that is, an unconscious, intersubjective
time that is co-constructed. Aevum is not simply about identifying a third
order of time; it further identifies the sensoria involved with experiencing
it. Kermode (1966/2000) writes, “such are those moments which
Augustine calls the moments of the soul’s attentiveness; less grandly,
they are moments of what psychologists call ‘temporal integration’”
(p. 71). He links this to the beginnings of what was to be called “spatial
form.” The cinematic aevum is not an empty time in the sense that it is
hollow – rather it is an arrested attentive duration within film that follows
traumatic scenes, “[the aevum] does not abolish time or spatialize it; it coexists with time, and is a mode in which things can be perpetual without
being eternal” (p. 72).
In the opening of The Headless Woman, Verónica (María Onetto) drives
away from a family gathering, listening to upbeat music on the radio.
Verónica’s cell phone rings and she tries to answer it but in doing so takes
her eyes off the road and hits something with her car. Our usual
expectation might be that the camera cuts to what was hit, but the point of
view never leaves the car, remaining static for a full minute in a shallow
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focused close-up on Verónica’s profile. Our attention is tethered to her
wrestling with what has just happened. Verónica continues driving,
pulling over a little later to get out of the car. Again, the camera remains in
the car, shifting slightly but does not follow Verónica who leaves and stays
out of focus. The sequence ends with thunder and rain on the car’s
windscreen. The static camera creates the interval of cinematic aevum
here, the sole intention of the empty time as traumatic duration being
audience integration with Verónica’s inability to be truthful with herself
rather than solve the mystery over what she hit. We do not follow her out
of the car during the static second aevum, instead remaining temporally
integrated with her turbulent inner world. It is not just the trauma of the
hit-and-run that is at stake, but the larger traumatic tumult already
present inside her.
This aesthetic tendency marks the beginning of the spectator’s parallel
time-fiction with Verónica’s unsettled inner world that is sustained
throughout the film. In later scenes, we remain with her, depsite not
knowing what is occuring. We are often left waiting with and around her
until she comes to a decision we are not privy to: for example, in the
bathroom after her medical check-up, Verónica listens in on other women
for around ninety seconds before leaving; or later, in her mother’s
bedroom, we sit with Verónica as she struggles with her sense of guilt,
hallucinating the young boy she believes she killed. As cinematic aeva,
these moments with Verónica are very much focused on her internal timeconsciousness and the turmoil of her inner world, offering the spectator
space to link such emotional experiences with their own arrested
attention. The cinematic aevum exists parallel to the actual duration of
the film, arresting the experience of the progression of cinematic time,
thereby serving to order the emotional experience of the trauma within
filmic sequences. The Headless Woman devises its affective force precisely
around these empty time moments, foregrounding the emotional time of
Verónica’s character. As empty time, aevum expresses the in-between
duration of sensory response, aesthetically attempting to link (process/
think) through the empty time of traumatic duration. Kermode writes that
“acts without ‘success’ are a property of the aevum” (p. 86), so inasmuch
as trauma can be defined by time, equally it has a capacity to fragment
and disrupt future time, disturbing the order and emotional experience of
life as tick-tock. The Headless Woman shows different time-fiction of
arrested attention via static camera to establish temporal integration via
empty time as cinematic aevum.
Time is key to the order and structure of reality and meaning, its
purpose in cinema directed to the structure of narrative and experience,
where most formal elements work to aestheticise time. Mary Ann Doane
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(2002) uses the story “The Kinetoscope of Time” as an example of the
affective component within the representability of time, contingent on
the emergence of new vision technologies. Cinema makes possible a
spectator’s affective immersion through the implicit order of image
duration, where other spaces and times were offered alongside noncinematic time and space: “the emerging cinema participated in a more
general cultural imperative, the structuring of time and contingency in
capitalist modernity” (Doane, 2002, pp. 3–4). Doane points out it was the
thinking or attitude toward time that changed with the advent of new
cinematic technology at the turn of the century, and in doing so, she
inadvertently touches on Kermode’s ideas. Fictions adapt and change in
response to the world that creates them, “they change because we no
longer live in a world with an historical tick which will certainly be
consummated by a definitive tock” (Kermode, 1966/2000, p. 64). Indeed,
Doane (2002) echoes Kermode’s position by foregrounding time as
something that was “felt – as a weight, as a source of anxiety, and as an
acutely pressing problem of representation” (p. 4). By now, we should see
this attitude of anxious, sensory experience concerning time reaching
beyond specific periods or contexts and highlighting the persistent need
for concord-fictions that make sense of our lives. Doane discusses the
notion of dead time and I wish to briefly note its similarity to the concept
of aevum and the association of empty time as traumatic duration
discussed here.
Dead time, for Doane (2002), is synonymous with the concept of
the event and can be aligned with Kermode’s aevum based on interval, as
“the event is a deictic marker of time […] deprived of meaning” (p. 140).
Doane also uses Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit to address the
experience of trauma in relationship to time, arguing, “in Freudian
psychoanalysis, trauma is the consequence of the nonassimilation of an
event that has its psychical impact years later, after the fact” (p. 140). In
framing the event as similar to trauma, as something unassimilable,
“which resists meaning […serving as] an assurance of the real” (p. 140),
Doane argues that “time itself resists structure,” making the association
that cinema itself functions as a traumatic time-fiction within reality. The
emergent identity of cinema as an event (disruptive and unassimilable) to
everyday life was born bound to time due to its apparatus, similar to
Kermode’s literary time-fictions. The film, as event, came to represent the
finitude of cinema but concurrently as an interval of time, a cinematic
aevum, that “remained tinged by the contingent, the unassimilable”
(p. 141). Doane’s study on early cinema as temporality and event
resonates with Kermode’s study of the fictions of the End as well as
Bion’s theory of linking thought and experience, through the nexus of
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trauma. These authors’ works help to demonstrate how the duration of
aevum (as interval, as event) offers a vital and polysemic time-consciousness for the spectator.
Bion’s approach to trauma differed from Freud’s (1920/1955)
theorisation of trauma. Where Bion focused on emotional experience as
the core of trauma and traumatic memory, Freud (1924/2007) did not
account for why returns to unpleasurable experiences were so common,
outside the economic problem of masochism and the repression involved
with repetition compulsion. Another significant difference within Bion’s
model is the inclusion of knowledge in the term “emotional experience.”
In addition to hate and love, knowledge (or knowing) is emotion for
Bion (1962): “an emotional experience cannot be conceived of in
isolation from a relationship […] (1) X loves Y; (2) X hates Y; and (3)
X knows Y” (pp. 42–43). As a proto-mental state, knowing is an embodied
sensory state of being and as emotion, this need-to-know sits at the
core of traumatic memory as a still present, still intense affect. From a
Bionian perspective, trauma is representative of the inability-to-know.
The inability-to-know is a consequence of negligence within maternal
preoccupation (alternative examples of the emotional experience of
“empty time as traumatic duration”), where the infant is unable to find an
adult (usually the mother) who can bear their own unconscious sadistic
and hateful feelings (Bion, 1962, pp. 95–99). These unconscious feelings
are fragments of the infant’s inner world, projected into the adult who is
responsible for their care. It is only when the infant has someone who can
bear these unbearable and unprocessable feelings (without shame or
admonition) that an ability and capacity to think emotional experience
can develop. Bion called this process containment and in the event that
emotional experience is not able to be contained (beared by the mother or
adult responsible for maternal preoccupation), the consequence is an
inability-to-know such emotional experience as integrated thought and
felt parts of our selves. This lack of integration resulting from noncontainment as the inability-to-know, results in thought being dissociated
from the thinking of emotional experience. The process of containment is
a psychic relational and emotional interval process. Containment is a
necessary aevum for infancy, an interstitial psychic position that continues
throughout adult life as the essential duration we need in order to
construct fictions of our selves. I need not state how traumatic this
duration can be or how vital it is.
When containment is not possible, these unconfined emotional
experiences (traumas) represent an inability-to-know parts of our
unconscious true selves. Such unknown fragments are not integrated,
remaining as separated, psychotic elements that threaten our present and
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future ability to make links and connections between the intuition
of sensoria and the conceptualisation of lived experience. Without a
capacity for linking, knowing, in a Bionian sense, comes under threat.
It was this threat to our need to know that Bion (1959/1967a) saw as
most destructive and traumatic, preparing the way for “a severe arrest of
development” (p. 107).
Arrested Attention
Empty time as cinematic aevum identifies a space of emotional experience
within the interpretation of fiction; more specifically, it is a way to consider
the experience of time that occurs via one’s engagement with fiction.
For Kermode (1966/2000), aevum extended to emotional experience
incurred in the interval between fictive story worlds and “our sense of real
time”, which he termed being “in certain postures of attentiveness”
(p. 195). In his Attacks on Linking (1959/1967a), Bion exemplifies the
fracture in the capacity to contain and associate links across emotional
experience through clinical examples of borderline psychosis, but this
example only accounts for the significance of a destructive form of
attack “on anything which is felt to have the function of linking one
object with another” (p. 93). As C. Fred Alford (2018) notes, the failure
to link emotional experience through words “is also a consequence of
the inability to associate experiences” (p. 47). Alford views trauma as
“the rupture of the container” (p. 47) and centres Bion’s attacks on linking
as a core model that permits reevaluation of traumatic experience and its
consequences. Despite noting that such application is in opposition to
how Bion originally viewed attacks on linking, trauma indicates that we
have lost an ability to link emotional experiences and, in Bionian terms,
this means that containment has been threatened, or at the very least
arrested. Cinema, more specifically the cinematic aevum, creates the
parallel of empty time to facilitate new links that might contain
“associations destroyed by trauma” (Alford, 2018, p. 48).
This inability-to-know and link experience is a common presentation
of trauma within cinema, noted in the inability to verbally communicate,
and in certain disruptive relationships with time – represented as
flashforwards/flashbacks to previous unconnected experiences, often
thought of as random memories, quite like the moments we spend with
Verónica in The Headless Woman. Kermode’s concept of aevum is observed
as working within cinema through the style of an in-between and
intersubjective empty time as traumatic duration, discussed in the
previous cinematic examples. The cinematic aevum reflects the time of
the character after traumatic scenes, facilitating an arrested attention in
the audience, who responds to the tensions created.
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Bion’s contribution post Freud and Klein, namely his emphasis on
thinking and the inclusion of knowing as emotional, sensory experience
and structure, enabled psychoanalytic models to move beyond hate/love
as primary states or agencies of desire. Bion saw knowing as central to
the establishment of emotional security, which is the laying down of
solid foundations for mental growth and functioning. For Bion (1962,
pp. 42–44), each emotion (Love / Hate / Knowing) has its negative
counterpart (-L, -H, -K). Where Freud’s theory of trauma focused on
repetition and repression, Bion’s approach shows that psychoanalysis can
speak to trauma as means to consider the interrelationship of the inner
emotional world and the external demands that are placed on it.
Cinematically, this occurs in the discord of audio-visual unity, of frozen
elements as shards within the mise-en-scène, and in the use of disruptive
cinematography, a recurrent style that often pertains to the inner world of
the character.
In Psycho, after Marion Crane (Janet Leigh) has fatally collapsed, half in
the bath and half on the bathroom floor, the camera leaves her and follows
the water and her blood escaping down the drain hole. The staccato
sound has also left, along with the score, and only the sound of the
shower running remains. This interval between her life ending, the
trauma of her murder and the rest of the film allows a third duration of
cinematic time to emerge, creating the capacity to link the trauma and
think with the film rather than emptying the experience of meaning. Such
formal aspects aesthetically link the time of the film and its characters
with audience reception pre and post diegetic trauma. The formal
aesthetics of “empty time” as interval or cinematic aevum are not intended
to be prescriptive, or even specifically in reference to traumatic narratives.
Indeed, the aim has been to recognise the practice or stylistic tendency to
formally craft a third duration of time that disrupts the actual duration,
invoking “arrested attention” in the audience. Time as containment
enables a third duration, a different order of time with the film.
Bion’s theory of thinking and “attacks on linking” demonstrate how
emotional experience within the context of trauma might well involve love
and hate, but it is our desire to know that emerges as most significant. The
inability-to-know (-K) is the denial of connections that offer meaning,
those that make emotional experience fruitful. Bion’s, “severe arrest of
development” echoes Kermode’s aevum as an experience he viewed as
being “in certain postures of attentiveness.” “Arrested development” and
“posture of attentiveness” are observed in the still elements of the three
films sequences I have discussed. While not everything is motionless in
the sequence, the time of the character has frozen. The events in Iris’s
bedroom become immobile, despite her own movement, yet the tracking

219

Film-Philosophy 24 (2020)
pan continues; Marion is dead, but the water moves and the pan
continues; Verónica has stepped outside her car but we remain with the
static frame inside while she walks about, her head just out of shot. Again,
not everything is arrested – however the time of the character is caught in
this “arrest of development” and the audience is in a “certain posture of
attentiveness.”
These examples indicate the various ways aevum as a third duration of
time occurs within cinema presenting time as containment for audiences
to process the traumatic emotion. The cinematography and audiovisual
styles used interrupt the actual duration of the film, and in doing so, time
itself is affected, specifically the time of the character. This third duration,
this cinematic aevum, acknowledges there are experiences of time within
human life that are inbetween finite time and eternity. The function of
linking that is specific to the cinematic aevum, and to the capacity to link
emotional experience, keeps us in “arrested attention.”
The recognition of “empty time” as a parallel duration in film following
scenes of trauma furthered the conceptualisation of a cinematic aevum,
which functions as an external catalyst and an attempt to part contain the
traumatic event, so that the audience can think, or link, their emotional
experience. My reason for specifying a cinematic aevum is to identify how
our experience with the screened, moving-image retains qualities of
Kermode’s aevum but furthers and diversifies formal attributes of aevum’s
in-between status that is medium-specific, particularly in terms of affect
and time.
Cinema responds in unique ways to the pressures and anxieties of
seemingly proximate social crises, as though they were crises of now
rather than long histories of experiences concerning repression, oppression, and marginalisation. Bionian psychoanalysis tells us that emotional
experience is intersubjective, a causality of external happenings in
everyday life negotiated with inner world phenomena. Our relationships
with other people are important, insofar as they contain the phenomena
felt. Bion’s model places a high level of importance on the inner world
over the external world, stating the sensory data we encounter shapes or
destroys our inner worlds. It is not just the recurrence in patterns of
fictions about the End, or of traumatic-time fictions but the recurrence in
creative expressions of different story worlds that contain embedded timefictions of crises. We can best speak to a cinematic aevum and its different
presentations in terms of formal aesthetic or narrative patterns. While
these forms evolve over time, interest in trauma-time fictions is not
discontinued but may be disconfirmed, and it may further eventuate that
disconfirmation is essential to the continuity of trauma-time fictions
in cinema.
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